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To what extent can the traditional tools of trade policy analysis be used to
analyse the economic costs of barriers to trade in services?
Traditional analysis of trade barriers has focused primarily on the eﬀects
of tariﬀs. These are discriminatory taxes levied on foreign-produced goods
at the border of a country.
The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) framework is a standard framework in which
tariﬀs have been analyzed (Heckscher [1919] 1949; Ohlin 1933). This frame-
work assumes perfect substitutability between domestically produced and
foreign goods of the same type, ﬁxed endowments of primary factors of pro-
duction, and perfect mobility of those factors between sectors within an
economy. The framework has been extended to consider more than two
goods and factors (Jones and Scheinkman 1977), the presence of a sector-
speciﬁc factor of production (Mayer 1974; Mussa 1974), imperfect compe-
tition (Markusen 1981), increasing returns to scale (Melvin 1969) and prod-
uct diﬀerentiation (Krugman 1979; Helpman 1981).
However, barriers to trade in services are unlike tariﬀs. They are typically
regulatory barriers, rather than explicit taxes. They need not discriminate
against foreigners. Indeed, barriers to market access are often designed to
protect incumbent ﬁrms from any new entry, be it by domestic or foreign
ﬁrms. And barriers to services trade are not restricted to aﬀecting the out-
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and Will Martin.putof services ﬁrms. One particularly important category of barriers to ser-
vices trade—restrictions on foreign direct investment by service ﬁrms—
aﬀects the use of primary factors. These restrictions are recognized in the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the World Trade
Organization (WTO), since this agreement recognizes commercial presence
as one of the modes by which services are traded.
To date, few papers of either a theoretical or an empirical nature have re-
viewed all these aspects of barriers to services trade. Some early papers
largely dismissed concerns that the determinants of comparative advantage
in services might diﬀer from those in goods (Hindley and Smith 1984; Dear-
dorﬀ1985). A few theoretical papers in the late 1980s examined some of the
important characteristics of services, including knowledge intensity (e.g.,
Markusen 1989; Melvin 1989). This characteristic also featured in subse-
quent analysis of goods trade under imperfect competition (e.g., Grossman
and Helpman 1991). However, those early theoretical papers did not look
at the nature of barriers to services trade. Recently, a few empirical papers
have examined the eﬀects of removing barriers to trade in services. Many of
these have failed to take account of barriers to commercial presence as an
important category of barriers to trade in services (Brown et al. 1995;
Brown, Deardorﬀ, and Stern 1996; Hertel 1999; Nagarajan 1999). One sem-
inal paper by Petri (1997) introduced a treatment of barriers to foreign di-
rect investment in the services sector, but it failed to take into account bar-
riers on the other modes of service delivery. Moreover, all empirical papers
have suﬀered from a dearth of convincing empirical estimates of the inci-
dence and economic signiﬁcance of barriers to services trade.
A recent empirical paper by Dee and Hanslow (2000) sought to analyze
the eﬀects of removing barriers to services trade in a more comprehensive
fashion.1 The barriers included nondiscriminatory barriers to market ac-
cess as well as discriminatory restrictions on national treatment. They in-
cluded barriers to commercial presence as well as barriers to the other
modes of service delivery. The focus of that paper was to compare the gains
from liberalizing services trade with the gains from removing all post-
Uruguay barriers to trade in agriculture and manufacturing. The paper also
compared the gains from the total removal of barriers to services trade with
the gains from several alternative approaches to partial liberalization. It
identiﬁed signiﬁcant second-best problems with some approaches to partial
liberalization.
The purpose of this paper is to look more deeply at that analysis of ser-
vices trade liberalization in order to assess the extent to which the tradi-
tional Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and Rybczynski (1955) results from
the HO framework are still relevant in a more realistic model of services
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1. Brown and Stern (2001) contains a services model that was developed independently and
shares a number of conceptual and data features with the model presented here.trade liberalization. In the process, the analysis examines whether and how
the beneﬁts of services trade liberalization are passed on to other sectors in
the economy. Thus, the analysis tries to open up the “black box” of what is
a rather complex general equilibrium model of services trade in order to
gain insights into the sectoral results from that model in terms of more
simple textbook treatments of trade policy analysis.
The structure of the paper is as follows. It ﬁrst describes the model used—
a multisector, multiregional computable general equilibrium model of
world trade and investment. The theoretical structure of the model covers
both foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment. The model’s
database contains estimates of FDI stocks and the activities of FDI ﬁrms,
each on a bilateral basis. Thus, the model recognizes that both goods and
services can be delivered via FDI as well as by conventional trade. The pa-
per then looks at the size of the barriers to trade in services and the cost im-
post they impose on other sectors of the economy. This analysis uses the
ﬁrst of a comprehensive new set of estimates of barriers to services trade. To
understand the general equilibrium eﬀects of removing these barriers, the
eﬀects on each sector in selected economies are built up from a more re-
stricted, partial equilibrium multicountry model. To this partial model are
gradually added the resource constraints and income linkages associated
with general equilibrium. It is as the resource constraints are added that the
relevance of Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski eﬀects can be analysed.
The paper then brieﬂy summarizes the implications of services trade liber-
alization for regional incomes. Finally, the paper identiﬁes areas for further
research.
1.1 The FTAP Model
The model is a version of the Global Trade Analysis Project model
(GTAP; Hertel 1997) with foreign direct investment, known as FTAP. The
treatment of FDI follows closely the pioneering work of Petri (1997). The
FTAP model also incorporates increasing returns to scale and large-group
monopolistic competition in all sectors. This follows Francois, McDonald,
and Nordstrom (1995), among others, who adopted this treatment for man-
ufacturing and resource sectors, and Brown et al. (1995) and Markusen,
Rutherford, and Tarr (1999), who used similar treatments for services. Fi-
nally, FTAP makes provision for capital accumulation and international
borrowing and lending. This uses a treatment of international (portfolio)
capital mobility developed by McDougall (1993) and recently incorporated
into GTAP by Verikios and Hanslow (1999). FTAP is implemented using
the GEMPACK software suite (Harrison and Pearson 1996). Its structure
is documented fully in Hanslow, Phamduc, and Verikios (1999). The model
and its documentation are available at the Productivity Commission web-
site at [http://www.pc.gov.au]. 
Measuring the Cost of Barriers to Trade in Services 131.1.1 Theoretical Structure
The FTAP model takes the standard GTAP framework as a description
of the location of economic activity and then disaggregates this by owner-
ship. For example, each industry located in Korea comprises Korean-
owned ﬁrms, along with U.S., Japanese, and other multinationals. Each of
these ﬁrm ownership types is modeled as making its own independent
choice of inputs to production, according to standard GTAP theory, and
each ﬁrm type has its own sales structure.
On the purchasing side, agents in each economy make choices among the
products or services of each ﬁrm type, distinguished by both ownership and
location, and then among the individual (and symmetric) ﬁrms of a given
type. Thus, the model recognizes the ﬁrm-level product diﬀerentiation as-
sociated with monopolistic competition. Firms choose among intermediate
inputs and investment goods, whereas households and governments choose
among ﬁnal goods and services.
Agents are assumed to choose ﬁrst among products or services from do-
mestic or foreign locations, with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
of 5. They then choose among particular foreign locations and among own-
ership categories in a particular location, both with a CES elasticity of sub-
stitution of 10. Finally, they choose among the individual ﬁrms of a partic-
ular ownership and location, with a CES elasticity of substitution of 15.
With ﬁrm-level product diﬀerentiation, agents beneﬁt from having more
ﬁrms to choose among, because it is more likely that they can ﬁnd a prod-
uct or service suited to their particular needs. Capitalizing on this, Francois,
McDonald, and Nordstrom (1995) show that the choice among individual
ﬁrms can be modeled in a conventional model of ﬁrm types (not ﬁrms) by
allowing a productivity improvement whenever the output of a particular
ﬁrm type (and hence the number of individual ﬁrms in it) expands. How-
ever, because the substitutability among individual ﬁrms is assumed here to
be very high, the incremental gain from greater variety is not very great, and
this productivity-enhancing eﬀect is not particularly strong (the elasticity of
productivity with respect to output is 1/15   0.0667).2
The ﬁrst two choices, among domestic and foreign locations, are identi-
cal to the choices in the original GTAP model. They have been parameter-
ized using values, 5 and 10, that are roughly twice the standard GTAP Arm-
ington elasticities. Two reasons can be given for doubling the standard
elasticities. One is that only with such elasticities can GTAP successfully re-
produce historical changes in trade patterns (Gehlhar 1997). The other is
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2. The equivalent elasticity of productivity with respect to inputs is 0.0667/(1 – 0.0667)  
0.0714, where this latter concept is used by Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom (1995). The
elasticities of productivity with respect to output and inputs are not equal because of the as-
sumption of increasing returns to scale. Another reason that scale eﬀects are not strong is that,
with this nested structure, the economies of scale are regional rather than global.that higher elasticities accord better with notions of ﬁrm-level product diﬀ-
erentiation. Further calibration of the model to historical data using meth-
ods of maximum entropy (e.g., Liu, Arndt, and Hertel 2000) may provide a
feasible means of reﬁning the above estimates of ﬁrm-level substitution pos-
sibilities in the future.
The order of the ﬁrst three choices, among locations and then among
ownership categories, is the opposite of the order adopted by Petri (1997).
The current treatment assumes that from a Korean perspective, for ex-
ample, a U.S. multinational located in Korea is a closer substitute for a
Korea-owned firm than it is for a U.S. firm located in the United States.
Petri’s treatment assumes that United States–owned firms are closer sub-
stitutes for each other than for Korean ﬁrms, irrespective of location.
There are two reasons for preferring the current treatment.
The ﬁrst is that Petri’s treatment produces a model in which multilateral
liberalization of tariﬀs on manufactured goods produces large economic
welfare losses, for most individual economies and for the world as a whole—
an uncomfortable result at odds with conventional trade theory. The reason
for the result is spelled out in more detail in Dee and Hanslow (2000).
The second reason for preferring the current treatment is that, in many
instances, it accords better with reality. One of the distinguishing charac-
teristics of services is that they are tailored each time to meet the needs of
the individual consumer. Another characteristic is that they are often deliv-
ered face-to-face, sometimes making commercial presence (through FDI)
the only viable means of trade. These characteristics taken together mean
that service ﬁrms in a given location, irrespective of ownership, will tailor
their services to meet local tastes and requirements and, thus, appear to be
close substitutes, as in the current treatment.
Whereas the demand for the output of ﬁrms distinguished by ownership
and location is determined as above, the supply of FDI is determined by the
same imperfect transformation among types of wealth as in Petri (1997). In-
vestors in each economy ﬁrst divide their wealth between “bonds” (which
can be thought of as any instrument of portfolio investment), real physical
capital, and land and natural resources in their country of residence. This
choice is governed by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) semi-
elasticity of 1, meaning that a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of re-
turn on real physical capital, for example, would increase the ratio of real
physical capital to bond holdings by 1 percent. A bond is a bond, irrespec-
tive of who issues it, implying perfect international arbitrage of rates of
return on bonds. However, capital in diﬀerent locations is seen as diﬀer-
ent things. Investors next choose the industry sector in which they invest
(with a CET semi-elasticity of 1.2). They next choose whether to invest at
home or overseas in their chosen sector (with a CET semi-elasticity of 1.3).
Finally, they choose a particular overseas region in which to invest (with a
CET semi-elasticity of 1.4).
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can be justiﬁed as reﬂecting some combination of risk aversion and less-
than-perfect information. It is important to note, however, that although
the measure of economic welfare in FTAP currently recognizes the positive
income contribution that FDI can make, it does not discount that for any
costs associated with risk taking, given risk aversion. This is an important
qualiﬁcation to the current results and will be the subject of further re-
search.
Although the chosen CET parameters at each “node” of the nesting
structure may appear low, the number of nests means that choices at the ﬁ-
nal level (across destinations of FDI) are actually very ﬂexible. For example,
it can be shown that, holding total wealth ﬁxed but allowing all other ad-
justments across asset types and locations to take place, the implied semi-
elasticity of transformation between foreign destinations can easily reach
20 and can be as high as 60. The variation across regions in these implied
elasticities comes about because of the diﬀerent initial shares of assets in
various regional portfolios.
The choice of CET parameters at each node was determined partly by
this consideration of what they implied for the ﬁnal elasticities, holding only
total wealth constant. They were also chosen so that this version of FTAP
gave results that were broadly comparable to an earlier version of GTAP
with imperfect international (portfolio) capital mobility, for experiments
involving the complete liberalization of agricultural and manufacturing
protection (Verikios and Hanslow 1999). Imperfect capital mobility was
also a feature of the GTAP-based examination of Asia-Paciﬁc Economic
Cooperation (APEC) liberalization by Dee, Geisler, and Watts (1996) and
Dee, Hardin, and Schuele (1998). These parameters thus provide a familiar
starting point from which reﬁnements could be made in the future, possibly
based on methods of maximum entropy.
In one respect, however, the current version of FTAP does diﬀer from
previous versions of GTAP with imperfect capital mobility. The GTAP
variants assumed that capital was perfectly mobile across sectors, whereas
FTAP has less-than-perfect sectoral mobility. Furthermore, the choice of
sector is relatively early in the nesting structure, so that the implied elastic-
ities guiding choice of sector, holding only total wealth constant, are rela-
tively low (e.g., 1.2 in the United States). As a result, FTAP tends to exhibit
the behavior that resources move less readily between sectors in a given re-
gion but more readily across regions in a given sector, although the diﬀer-
ences are not dramatic. The current treatment is consistent with the idea
that the knowledge capital often required to succeed in FDI, despite the
diﬃculties of language and distance, is likely to be sector speciﬁc.
Petri’s model assumed that total wealth in each region was ﬁxed. In FTAP,
although regional endowments of land and natural resources are ﬁxed (and
held solely by each region’s residents), regional capital stocks can accumu-
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nance the accumulation of domestic and foreign capital by each region’s in-
vestors. The treatment of capital accumulation follows the original treat-
ment of McDougall (1993) and was also used by Verikios and Hanslow
(1999); Dee, Geisler, and Watts (1996); and Dee, Hardin, and Schuele (1998).
With this treatment of capital accumulation, FTAP provides a long-run
snapshot view of the impact of trade liberalization, ten years after it has oc-
curred. To the extent that liberalization leads to changes in regional in-
comes and saving, this will be reﬂected in changes to the capital stocks that
investors in each region will have been able to accumulate. As noted, in-
vestors in each region are not restricted to their own saving pool in order to
ﬁnance capital investment. They may also issue bonds to help with that in-
vestment, but only according to their own preferences about capital versus
bond holding, and only according to the willingness of others to accept the
additional bonds. 
1.1.2 Model Database
The starting point for FTAP’s database was not the standard GTAP
database, because this includes measures of trade and investment barriers
that are still to be eliminated under the Uruguay Round agreement. Instead,
the starting point was an updated version of the GTAP database, following
a simulation in which the barriers yet to be eliminated under the Uruguay
Round had been removed. Such a database was provided by the work of
Verikios and Hanslow (1999), under their assumption of less-than-perfect
capital mobility.
Foreign Direct Investment Data
The Petri treatment of FDI requires the addition of data on bilateral FDI
stocks and on the activity levels and cost and sales structures of FDI ﬁrms.
The methods used to estimate such data were similar to those of Petri. Both
APEC (1995) and United Nations (1994) provided limited data on FDI
stocks by source, destination, and sector. These data were ﬂeshed out to
provide a full bilateral matrix of FDI stocks by source, destination, and sec-
tor, using RAS methods (Welsh and Strzelecki 2000). Thus, the individual
bilateral estimates may be unreliable, although the more aggregate data
match published totals. The resulting estimates are summarized in Dee and
Hanslow (2000). The data were collected (and the model implemented) for
nineteen regions and three broad sectors. The three sectors—primary (agri-
culture, resources, and processed food), secondary (other manufacturing),
and tertiary (services)—correspond broadly to the three areas of potential
trade negotiation in a new trade round. The intention is to use similar meth-
ods to produce a model with greater sectoral detail in the future.
One problem with such FDI data is that they distinguish FDI from port-
folio investment according to whether the investor (or investing ﬁrm) has an
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cient to ensure control of an enterprise.3 For some purposes, researchers
have instead considered aﬃliates that are majority owned—in which the
combined ownership of those persons individually owning 10 percent or
more from a particular country exceeds 50 percent. In the current context,
a better approach in the future may be to recognize explicitly the size of the
equity stake that diﬀerent countries (including the local host) have in an en-
terprise, especially since some barriers to services trade are explicitly de-
signed to control the extent of foreign ownership. This is an area for further
research.
The FDI stock data were used in turn to generate estimates of the output
levels of FDI ﬁrms. To do this, we estimated capital income ﬂows by multi-
plying the FDI stocks by rates of return. These capital rentals were then
grossed up to get an output estimate for FDI ﬁrms, using ratios of capital
rentals to output from the GTAP database. Again, the resulting estimates
are similar to those in Petri (1997) and are summarized in Dee and Hanslow
(2000). A possible future reﬁnement would be to use additional information
on the ratio of value added to output from U.S. and Japanese data on the
activities of oﬀshore aﬃliates (e.g., Baldwin and Kimura 1998; Kimura and
Baldwin 1998). Petri (1997) shows how estimates obtained using diﬀerent
methods can diﬀer, sometimes widely. Nevertheless, experience shows that
models such as these are more sensitive to estimates of the extent of barri-
ers to services trade than they are to estimates of the underlying services
trade and FDI ﬂows.
The detailed cost and sales structures of FDI ﬁrms were assumed to be
the same as for locally owned ﬁrms and were obtained by prorating the
GTAP database. A subject for future research would be to make use of in-
formation on the true cost and sales structures of FDI ﬁrms, again using
available U.S. and Japanese data on the activities of oﬀshore aﬃliates.
Estimates of Barriers to Services Trade
Estimates of existing barriers to services trade were injected into the
model’s database, using the techniques of Malcolm (1998). The process is
documented in Hanslow et al. (2000).
The estimates of barriers to services trade were the ﬁrst of a comprehen-
sive new set of estimates, documented in Findlay and Warren (2000). The
general methodology of these studies is as follows.
• Qualitative information on barriers to services trade is converted to a
quantitative index measure of trade restrictiveness, based on coverage
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3. Another potential problem is that two or more countries can treat that same ﬁrm as a for-
eign aﬃliate. Although in some contexts this can lead to double counting, in the current con-
text it does not because the FDI stock data have not been “grossed up” to account for other
owners (which could also include local joint venture partners).and some initial judgments about the relative restrictiveness of the
diﬀerent sorts of restrictions.
• An econometric model is developed to measure the determinants of the
economic performance (e.g., price, proﬁt margin, cost, or quantity) of
service ﬁrms in a given sector in diﬀerent countries, taking account of
all the factors that economic theory would suggest are relevant, in-
cluding the index measure of trade restrictiveness.
• The economic model is used to estimate the determinants of economic
performance. Wherever possible, the components of the trade restric-
tiveness index are entered separately so that the econometrics can re-
veal something about the relative weights attached to the separate com-
ponents.4
• The results of the econometrics are used to calculate the eﬀect of trade
restrictions on performance. Where necessary, quantity or proﬁt eﬀects
are converted to price or cost eﬀects.
Estimates of barriers to trade in banking services along these lines were
taken from Kaleeswaran et al. (2000), and estimates of barriers to trade in
telecommunications services were taken from Warren (2000). The rates can
be taken as indicative of post-Uruguay rates, because although the Uruguay
Round established the architecture for services trade negotiations, it did not
achieve much in the way of services trade liberalization (Hoekman 1995).
For modelling purposes, the barrier estimates were decomposed accord-
ing to a two-by-two classiﬁcation.
• The GATS framework distinguishes four modes of service delivery: via
commercial presence, cross-border supply, consumption abroad, and
the presence of natural persons. Accordingly, the FTAP model distin-
guishes barriers to establishment from barriers to ongoing operation.
This is similar to the distinction between commercial presence and
other modes of delivery, because barriers to establishment are a com-
ponent of the barriers to commercial presence. Barriers to establish-
ment are modeled as taxes on the movement of capital. Barriers to
ongoing operation are modeled as taxes on the output of the service-
providing ﬁrms.
• The GATS framework also distinguishes restrictions on market access
from restrictions on national treatment. As noted above, the former are
restrictions on entry, be it by locally owned or foreign-owned ﬁrms. In
the FTAP model, they are treated as nondiscriminatory. Restrictions
on national treatment mean that foreign-owned ﬁrms are treated less
favorably than domestic ﬁrms. These restrictions are treated as dis-
criminatory.
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4. This is not possible where there is high multicollinearity between the various components,
or where there is a lack of in-sample variation in some of the components.The decomposition of trade barriers into this two-by-two classiﬁcation
follows the classiﬁcations used by Kaleeswaran et al. (2000) and Warren
(2000). Table 1.1 shows how they classify barriers to trade in banking and
telecommunications services. Note that in the banking sector, prudential
regulations were not counted as trade barriers or included in the restric-
tiveness index. This was based on the recognition that they are designed to
address a genuine market failure and the judgment that they are generally
20 Philippa Dee, Kevin Hanslow, and Tien Phamduc
Table 1.1 Classifying Barriers to Trade in Banking and Telecommunications Services
Nondiscriminatory Barriers Discriminatory Derogations
to Market Access from National Treatment
Barriers to Establishment
Banking Are there restrictions on the number  Are there restrictions on the number 
of bank licenses? of foreign bank licenses?
Are there restrictions on foreign
equity investment or requirements
for foreigners to enter through a
joint venture with a domestic bank?
Are there restrictions on the
permanent movement of people?
Telecommunications One measure of restriction is actual  What percentage of foreign invest-
number of competitors in ﬁxed and  ment is allowed in competitive 
mobile markets. carriers?
Is there an enforced monopoly, par-
tial competition or full competition 
in various ﬁxed line markets and mo-
bile market?
What percentage of the incumbent 
ﬁxed or mobile operator is privatised?
Barriers to Ongoing Operation
Banking Are there general restrictions on  Are foreign banks restricted in 
raising funds, lending, providing  raising funds, lending, providing 
other lines of business, or expanding  other lines of business, or expanding
the number of banking outlets? the number of banking outlets?
Are there restrictions on the propor-
tion of foreigners on the board of
directors?
Are there restrictions on the
temporary movement of people?
Telecommunications Are there restrictions on leased lines  Are there restrictions on callback 
or private networks? services?
Are there restrictions on third party 
resale?
Are there restrictions on connection 
of leased lines and private networks 
to the public switched telephone 
network?
Source: McGuire and Schuele (2000) and Warren (2000).implemented in an appropriate fashion to that end. It is also consistent with
the so-called “prudential carve-out” allowed for in the GATS.
Note also that in the banking study, horizontal (i.e., not sector-speciﬁc)
restrictions on the permanent movement of people were counted as a bar-
rier to establishment, and hence they were modeled as a barrier to the move-
ment of capital. More properly, these restrictions should be modeled as a
barrier to the movement of labor, but so far FTAP does not allow for inter-
national labor mobility. Similarly, horizontal restrictions on the temporary
movement of people were counted as a barrier to ongoing operation, aﬀect-
ing both oﬀshore aﬃliates and services delivered via “cross-border” trade,
where the latter is broadly deﬁned to include services delivered via the tem-
porary movement of the consumer or the producer. In reality, the barriers
aﬀecting true cross-border trade are suﬃciently diﬀerent from those aﬀect-
ing trade involving temporary movement to warrant modeling them sepa-
rately. These are areas for further research.
A simple average of the estimated price eﬀects of barriers to trade in
banking and telecommunications was taken as being typical of most ser-
vices—all of the GTAP service categories of trade and transport; ﬁnance,
business, and recreational services; and half of public administration,
defense, education, and health. The remainder of public administration,
defense, education, and health, along with electricity, water and gas, con-
struction, and ownership of dwellings were assumed to be strictly non-
traded (note that engineering services are part of business services, not con-
struction). The resulting average estimates of barriers to trade in the tertiary
sector would have been about 50 to 100 percent bigger had the banking and
telecommunications estimates been taken as indicative of the whole of the
services sector. A procedure for future research is to use the next version of
the GTAP database, which will have more services-sector detail, to model
barriers to each service separately, thus overcoming the extreme arbitrari-
ness of these assumptions. In the meantime, the computational results
should be treated as preliminary and interpreted with appropriate caution.
The resulting structure of post-Uruguay barriers to trade in services is
summarized in table 1.2. Barriers to trade in primary (agricultural, resource,
and processed food) and secondary (manufacturing) products are also
shown for comparison purposes. Barriers to primary products are repre-
sented via a combination of taxes on imports, and subsidies (shown in table
1.2 as negative taxes) on exports and output. Unfortunately, at FTAP’s three-
sector level of aggregation, the actual taxes on primary exports and output
are a combination of subsidies used for protective purposes, and taxes (e.g.,
excises on alcohol and tobacco) used for revenue raising. (Although the av-
erage taxes on primary output are not shown in table 1.2, they are all rela-
tively small and mostly positive.) In future, using a database with greater sec-
toral detail will reduce the problems associated with “aggregation bias.”
In the services sector, as noted above, barriers to establishment have been








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.modeled as taxes on capital. Barriers to ongoing operation may aﬀect either
FDI ﬁrms or those supplying via the other modes and have been modeled
as taxes on the output of locally based ﬁrms (either domestic or foreign
owned) and taxes of the same size on the exports of ﬁrms supplying via the
other modes, respectively. The estimates of export taxes on services in the
fourth column of table 1.2 are trade-weighted averages of the taxes on ex-
ports to particular destinations, where these are equal in turn to the taxes
on foreign aﬃliates’ output in the destination region, shown in the sixth col-
umn. These are modeled as taxes in the exporting region, rather than as
tariﬀs in the importing region, to allow the rents created by the barriers to
be retained in the exporting region. The issue of rents is addressed in more
detail shortly.
The model also distinguishes restrictions on market access from restric-
tions on national treatment. The taxes on domestic capital and domestic
output in table 1.2 represent the eﬀects of restrictions on market access
(aﬀecting establishment and ongoing operation, respectively). The taxes on
the capital and output of foreign aﬃliates are higher than the correspon-
ding taxes on domestic ﬁrms, because they represent the eﬀects of restric-
tions on both market access and national treatment.
The estimates in table 1.2 indicate that barriers to trade in services are
generally at least as large as those on agricultural and manufactured prod-
ucts. Most economies have at least some signiﬁcant barriers to trade in ser-
vices. The only regions where barriers are low across the board are New
Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, Canada, the United States, and the European
Union. However, this statement should be heavily qualiﬁed, because it is
based only on estimates of barriers to banking and telecommunications. In
the same vein, the estimates of overall barriers to services trade for China
are very high, because the estimates of barriers to telecommunications ser-
vices in China are particularly high, as they are in a number of other low-
income developing economies. Estimates based on a broader set of services
sectors are likely to produce less variation in overall estimates of services
trade barriers across economies.
Barriers to trade in services have been modeled as tax equivalents that
generate rents—a markup of price over cost—rather than as things that
raise costs above what they might otherwise have been (e.g., Hertel 1999;
Brown and Stern 2001). This decision was based on the way in which the
price impacts of barriers to trade in banking and telecommunications
services were measured. Kaleeswaran et al. (2000) measured the eﬀects of
trade restrictions on the net interest margins of banks, a direct measure
of banks’ markup of price over cost.5 Warren (2000) measured the eﬀects
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5. Net interest margins—a measure of the diﬀerence between borrowing and lending rates
of interest—can also be thought of as the “price” of ﬁnancial intermediation services. The
econometric model used to test the signiﬁcance of barriers to trade in banking services was de-
veloped from an economic model of ﬁnancial intermediation.of trade restrictions on the quantities of telecommunications services de-
livered, and these were converted to price impacts using an estimate of the
elasticity of demand for telecommunications services. Thus, Warren’s esti-
mates did not provide direct evidence of a markup of price over cost, but the
relative proﬁtability of telecommunications companies in many countries
suggests that some element of rent may exist. By contrast, there is evidence
that trade restrictions in sectors such as aviation raise costs (Johnson et al.
2000). As estimates of the eﬀects of trade barriers in these sectors are in-
corporated into the model, it will be appropriate to treat some restrictions
as cost-raising rather than as rent-creating.
One important implication of the current treatment is that welfare gains
from liberalizing trade in services are likely to be understated, perhaps sig-
niﬁcantly. If trade restrictions create rents, then the allocative eﬃciency
gains from trade liberalization are the “triangle” gains associated with put-
ting a given quantum of resources to more eﬃcient use. By contrast, if trade
restrictions raise costs, the gains from trade liberalization include “rectan-
gle” gains (qualiﬁed by general-equilibrium eﬀects) from lower costs, equiv-
alent to a larger eﬀective quantum of resources for productive use.
Because barriers to services trade appear to be signiﬁcant, and because
they have been modeled as taxes, the rents they generate will be signiﬁcant.
A key issue is whether those rents should be modeled as being retained by
incumbent ﬁrms, appropriated by governments via taxation, or passed from
one country to another by transfer pricing or other mechanisms. In FTAP,
the rents on exports have been modeled as accruing to the selling region,
and those on FDI have been modeled as accruing to the region of owner-
ship, after the government in the region of location has taxed them at its
general property income tax rate. Despite this, the asset choices of investors
are modeled as being driven by pretax rates of return. This is because many
economies, in the developed world at least, have primarily destination-
based tax systems. For example, if tax credits are granted for taxes paid
overseas, investors are ultimately taxed on allincome at the owning region’s
tax rate. Although such tax credits have not been modeled explicitly, their
eﬀect has been captured by having investors respond to relative pretax rates
of return. Nevertheless, investor choices are also assumed to be determined
by rates of return excluding any abnormal rent component. Investors would
like to supply an amount of capital consistent with rates of return including
abnormal rents, but they are prevented from doing so by barriers to invest-
ment. The amount of capital actually supplied is, therefore, that amount
that investors would like to supply at rates of return excluding abnormal
rents.
Thus, a portion of the rent associated with barriers to services trade is as-
sumed to remain in the region of location in the form of property income
tax revenue, whereas the remainder accrues to the region of ownership.
Thus, liberalization of services trade could have signiﬁcant income eﬀects
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and Hanslow (2000) show in detail how signiﬁcant these eﬀects are, relative
to the allocative eﬃciency eﬀects and other eﬀects normally associated with
trade liberalization.
A ﬁnal point to note is that the model’s database does not contain esti-
mates of barriers to investment in agriculture and manufacturing, even
though they are likely to be signiﬁcant. It is unlikely that a new trade round
would include negotiations on them. Nevertheless, their omission will aﬀect
the model’s estimates of the eﬀects of liberalization elsewhere, and the re-
sults need to be qualiﬁed accordingly.
1.2 The Cost Impact of Barriers to Trade in Services
Table 1.2 shows that the direct “tax equivalents” of barriers to trade in
services are often signiﬁcant, compared with the trade barriers expected to
remain in agriculture and manufacturing after full implementation of the
Uruguay Round. It also shows that barriers to services trade tend to be
much higher in developing than in developed economies.
A priori, this does not mean that the services sectors in developing
economies would suﬀer most from services trade liberalization. Because
barriers to services trade are unlike tariﬀs, there are two key mechanisms by
which the services sectors in developing countries could expand following
services trade liberalization.
• Not all services trade barriers discriminate against foreign services
suppliers, so the services sector could expand because of new domestic
entry.
• Some services trade barriers restrict inward FDI, so the services sector
could expand because of new foreign entry.
These mechanisms could be suﬃcient to oﬀset the traditional mecha-
nisms by which a protected sector can be harmed by removal of protection.
• Some services barriers discriminate against foreign services delivered
cross-border, so the services sector could contract in the face of addi-
tional import competition.
• Services trade liberalization may beneﬁt downstream using industries,
and the services sector may lose out in the competition for domestic re-
sources (e.g., labor).
Figure 1.1examines the extent to which downstream using industries are
likely to beneﬁt from services trade liberalization. It shows the direct and in-
direct cost impost of domestic barriers to trade in services on all sectors in
selected model regions, as calculated from the FTAP model database.
In general terms, the ﬁgure shows the direct and indirect input require-
ments needed to produce a unit of ﬁnal demand in each sector. For example,
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quire inputs of unprocessed food (another primary activity), as well as
packaging materials from the secondary sector. The packaging materials
might again require inputs from forestry (a primary activity), along with
electricity from the tertiary sector. Each of these direct and indirect inputs
would have its own requirements for labor, capital, ﬁxed factors (land and
natural resources), and imported inputs, and these can be added up. Where




Fig. 1.1 Direct and indirect input requirements per unit of ﬁnal demand: A, Japan;
B, the United States; C, Korea; D, Taiwan; E, Hong Kong; F, Indonesia; G,
Malaysia; H, the Philippines; I, Singapore; J, Thailand; K, Chinathe cost of the direct and indirect inputs is inﬂated by taxes, the direct and
indirect tax contributions can also be calculated.
Thus, the direct and indirect cost impost of domestic barriers to services
trade has been calculated by adding together the following:
• the output and capital taxes on direct and indirect services inputs,
where those taxes represent the eﬀects of domestic barriers to com-
mercial presence (both establishment and ongoing operation); and 
• the export taxes in the source region falling on direct and indirect im-




Fig. 1.1 (cont.)ported inputs, where these export taxes represent the eﬀects of domes-
tic barriers to cross-border services trade (where the term cross-border
is interpreted loosely to include services traded via the temporary
movement of the producer or consumer).
All other domestic taxes are collected in the contribution of “Other
taxes,” and all other taxes on imports (primarily tariﬀs) are included with
the contribution of “Imports.”
Figure 1.1 shows that, in every region shown, the greatest unit cost im-
post from services trade barriers falls on the services sector itself. This re-
ﬂects two factors. First, the services sector experiences a direct taxing eﬀect,
whereas in other sectors the burden is indirect, through the higher cost of
service inputs. Second, this eﬀect is reinforced by the fact that in both de-
veloped and developing economies, the services sector itself tends to have a
higher direct services input requirement than any other sector. Although
other sectors may need service inputs, the greatest intensity of use of ser-
vices is within the services sector itself. Thus, as will be seen, the beneﬁts of
services trade liberalization in many economies are concentrated within the
services sector. This result is contrary to the normal eﬀects of tariﬀremoval,
where the beneﬁts are typically concentrated in other sectors.
Another feature of ﬁgure 1.1 is that in the economies with the highest per
capita incomes (Japan, the United States, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong),
the cost impost of domestic services trade barriers on other sectors is mini-
mal. Although these economies tend to be more service dependent, in terms
of having higher direct service input requirements, their domestic barriers
to services trade are also relatively low. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in the economies with the lowest per capita in-
comes (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
China), the cost impost of domestic services trade barriers on other sectors
is not much greater. Only in China, where services trade barriers are partic-
ularly high, does the cost impost on other sectors approach 10 percent.6
By showing the cost impost of only domestic barriers to trade in ser-
vices, ﬁgure 1.1 understates the potential ﬁrst-round impact of multilateral
liberalization of services trade. When barriers are removed globally, not
only will domestic goods and services be cheaper, but so too will goods and
services available in other economies. This beneﬁt is likely to be signiﬁcant
in the highly import-intensive economies such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. Moreover, because the
trade and transport services used to ship goods internationally will also be
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6. The cost impost is estimated to be particularly high in China because its telecommunica-
tions market is particularly restrictive. When estimates of services barriers are incorporated for
a broader range of services than banking and telecommunications, the overall cost imposts
could diﬀer from those shown here. Not only could the overall impost in China be lower, but
the impost in developed countries could also be higher (since banking and telecommunica-
tions happen to be sectors in which developed countries are particularly liberal).cheaper, there will be an additional cost reduction eﬀect not captured in
ﬁgure 1.1.
1.3 The Sectoral Eﬀects of Removing Barriers to Trade in Services
1.3.1 Partial Equilibrium Eﬀects on Sectoral Output
A useful way to understand the sectoral eﬀects of removing barriers to
trade in services is to start with a partial equilibrium framework and to
gradually add the economy-wide constraints that distinguish a general from
a partial equilibrium approach. This is a very useful technique of analysis,
developed by Hertel (1997).
An initial partial equilibrium model is obtained by “turning oﬀ” the fol-
lowing parts of FTAP:
• Factor supply constraints. Each sector in each region can get all the la-
bor and capital it needs at the going wage or rental price. Thus, the sec-
ondary and tertiary sectors in each region have horizontal supply
curves (which nevertheless move downward as services barriers are re-
moved). The primary sector continues to have an upward-sloping
supply curve because ﬁxed factors (land and natural resources) are still
treated as being in ﬁxed supply in each economy.
• Income linkages. Irrespective of what is projected to happen to factor
prices and other variables, the model’s measure of welfare is held ﬁxed
in each region. This “equivalent variation” is essentially a measure of
net national product, or the real income accruing to the residents of
each economy. In general equilibrium, it is aﬀected not just by the
amount of activity generated within a region, but also by net foreign in-
terest and dividend payments associated with foreign borrowing and
lending and with FDI.
• The endogenous productivity and taste changes associated with a love of
variety. (In the full FTAP model, ﬁrms beneﬁt from a wider choice of
intermediate inputs in the same way that consumers beneﬁt from a
wider choice of ﬁnal goods.)
In partial equilibrium, all the demand-side substitution possibilities of
the full FTAP model are still in operation. Thus, for example, the demand
for the output of the secondary sector in a region will depend on the fol-
lowing factors:
• how the cost (and hence price) of its output changes relative to the cost
(and price) of output of secondary sectors in other economies, and how
consumers and users in each region substitute between domestic and
various imported sources of secondary output as a result of those rela-
tive price changes;
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Table 1.3 Partial Equilibrium Effects on Selected Regions of Removing Global Barriers to
Trade in Services, by sector (%)
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Q Pd Pm Q Pd Pm Q Pd Pm
Japan –0.3 –2.4 –0.9 –1.4 –2.6 –3.9 –3.4 –2.1 –21.9
United States –1.3 –0.7 –1.3 –7.3 –0.6 –3.3 –4.3 –0.4 –13.6
Korea –0.1 –1.9 –1.0 2.3 –2.9 –3.1 –2.3 –3.5 –16.3
Taiwan 1.2 –1.2 –0.9 2.9 –2.3 –2.9 –4.5 –2.5 –14.7
Hong Kong 6.9 –1.1 0.1 15.2 –3.8 –3.9 –14.5 –5.2 –23.1
Indonesia 2.7 –0.5 –0.9 8.8 –3.6 –3.1 13.4 –12.1 –30.6
Malaysia 4.2 0.5 –0.9 6.9 –3.3 –2.9 0.3 –8.2 –21.3
The Philippines 1.2 –1.1 –0.9 2.9 –2.9 –2.9 8.1 –7.5 –27.9
Singapore 18.2 –1.6 –0.9 8.9 –3.5 –3.0 1.9 –6.7 –19.6
Thailand 3.1 0.6 –1.3 –5.3 –1.9 –3.0 0.3 –7.6 –21.9
China 36.6 18.1 –1.2 132.0 –10.2 –2.6 245.2 –27.9 –31.9
Source: FTAP model projections, partial equilibrium closure.
Notes: Q = domestic output quantity; Pd = domestic price; Pm = import price.
• how the cost (and hence price) of its output changes relative to the av-
erage price (across sources) of primary and tertiary output, and how
domestic consumers and government substitute between the outputs
of these diﬀerent sectors as a result of these relative price changes;7and
• what the secondary input requirements are per unit of output in other
sectors, and whether those other sectors are expanding or contracting.
Thus, even in the partial equilibrium model, the richness of substitution
possibilities and interindustry linkages on the demand side make for a
rather complicated story.
Because real incomes in each economy are assumed to be ﬁxed, it would
be expected that unless substitution eﬀects dominate, the demand for, and
hence output of, a commodity or service should increase whenever services
trade liberalization reduces its price. And the only sector in which services
trade liberalization would conceivably not reduce the price is the primary
sector, where the return to the ﬁxed factor could conceivably be bid up.
Thus, the presumption is that services trade liberalization should reduce
prices and increase output. Where this does not occur, it must be as a result
of substitution eﬀects.
Within the services sector itself, prices fall and output rises in the
ASEAN economies and China (table 1.3). Note that although the prices of
domestic services fall in these economies, the prices of imported services
7. In FTAP, as in GTAP, consumers and government are the only agents to substitute di-
rectly among diﬀerent commodities. For intermediate and investment usage, diﬀerent com-
modities (aggregated across sources) are used in ﬁxed proportions.fall by signiﬁcantly more. Thus, substitution toward imports in these
economies might suggest that services output should fall. Oﬀsetting this,
however, is an increase in exports of services from these economies. In the
services sector, the price of a service import in the destination country can
fall by signiﬁcantly more than its output price in the exporting country. This
is primarily because services trade liberalization involves removing the “ex-
port tax” equivalent of barriers to cross-border trade imposed by the desti-
nation country. Thus, although domestic services in the ASEAN region and
China are disadvantaged relative to imports at home, when the same ser-
vices are exported, their prices compare favorably with service exports from
most other regions. (This is indicated indirectly by the fact that the domes-
tic output price of services falls by more in ASEAN and China than in the
other regions.) Thus, the services output expansion in ASEAN and China
is primarily an export story.
In the higher per capita income economies, services output falls, despite
a reduction in the domestic price, because of substitution toward imports.
This is in accordance with the relative price movements shown in table 1.3.
The declines in the output of the secondary sector in Japan and the
United States are because of substitution toward imports, especially in in-
termediate usage. For the other higher-income economies (Korea, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong), the prices of domestic secondary output do not change
greatly relative to secondary import prices, so the secondary-output expan-
sions in these economies are primarily an export story. In ASEAN and
China, the secondary-output expansions are because of both increased ex-
ports and substitution away from imports.
Although in the secondary and tertiary sectors the results are driven pri-
marily by substitution among diﬀerent sources of each commodity, in the
primary sector it is possible to see the eﬀects of each region’s households’
substituting among diﬀerent commodities. This explains the slight falls in
the output of the primary sector in Japan and Korea. In these economies,
the prices of imported services fall signiﬁcantly more than the prices of any
other final commodity. Households tend to substitute toward imported
services and away from everything else. Thus, primary output in these
economies falls, despite the fact that the price of domestic primary output
falls by more than its import price.
In the United States, the eﬀect on primary-sector output of households’
switching away from the primary sector in general is reinforced by substitu-
tion (in relative terms) toward primary imports.
In Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand, the expansion of the
primary sector is primarily an export story. (The landed cost plus insurance
and freight [c.i.f.] price of Thai primary exports falls, despite a slight in-
crease in the domestic output price, because of cheaper international trade
and transport services.) This can be conﬁrmed by looking at more detailed
model results not shown in table 1.3.
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holds away from the primary sector in general is oﬀset by increased inter-
mediate input demand, and some increase in export demand, for primary-
sector output. The increased intermediate demand occurs despite an
adverse relative price movement against imports (in all but the Philippines),
because of interindustry linkages between the primary sector and the down-
stream secondary and tertiary sectors.
In summary, multilateral liberalization of services trade reduces domes-
tic costs and prices across all economies, and the partial equilibrium sec-
toral eﬀects are of three types. 
• In economies such as those of Japan and the United States, where ini-
tial domestic services barriers are particularly low, domestic prices do
not fall by much, and substitution toward cheaper imports leads to a
reduction in output in all sectors of the economy. Real income can re-
main constant, however, because of the cheaper imports.
• At the other extreme, in the economies of the ASEAN region and
China, where initial domestic services barriers are relatively high, do-
mestic prices tend to fall signiﬁcantly, and output in (almost) all sectors
of these economies expands.
• In between are the economies of Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong,
where initial domestic services barriers are moderate, but where all sec-
tors are more trade exposed than in Japan and the United States. Thus,
although the services sectors in these economies may not beneﬁt from
services trade liberalization, at least some of their other sectors beneﬁt
from cheaper domestic and imported inputs and thus gain an advan-
tage on export markets.
1.3.2 General Equilibrium Eﬀects on Sectoral Output
The partial equilibrium results of table 1.3 assumed that each sector in
each economy could get any additional labor and capital at the going wage
or rental price. The results also ignored the income implications of services
trade liberalization.
In table 1.4, these eﬀects are gradually reintroduced into the model. The
ﬁrst column reproduces the partial equilibrium results from table 1.3. In the
second column, primary factor supply constraints are imposed. As in text-
book models, aggregate supplies of capital and labor are assumed to be
ﬁxed, and these factors are treated as being perfectly mobile within each
sector of the economy. In the third column, sectoral capital stocks are as-
sumed to take the values they would in the full general equilibrium model.
Thus, not only do aggregate capital stocks change in each economy, but
capital is no longer perfectly mobile across sectors. Finally, the full general
equilibrium results are presented. These incorporate not only the primary
factor behavior of the full general equilibrium model, but also the associ-
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Regions of Removing Global Barriers to Trade in Services (%)
Full Capital as in Full
Partial Fixed General General
Equilibrium Factors Equilibrium Equilibrium
Japan
Primary –0.3 0.2 –0.3 –0.4
Secondary –1.4 0.9 –0.5 –0.3
Tertiary –3.4 –0.3 0.2 0.1
United States
Primary –1.3 2.4 0.4 0.6
Secondary –7.3 1.9 0.2 0.6
Tertiary –4.3 –0.7 –0.2 –0.4
Koreaa
Primary –0.1 –0.5 –0.7 –0.8
Secondary 2.3 –0.4 –1.4 –1.6
Tertiary –2.3 0.3 1.0 1.1
Taiwana
Primary 1.2 0.4 –0.1 0.1
Secondary 2.9 2.5 0.2 1.0
Tertiary –4.5 –1.1 0.1 –0.2
Hong Konga
Primary 6.9 3.7 0.0 0.2
Secondary 15.2 9.0 –1.2 –2.2
Tertiary –14.5 –2.1 0.4 0.6
Indonesiaa
Primary 2.7 –3.4 0.3 0.3
Secondary 8.8 –9.7 2.5 2.6
Tertiary 13.4 8.9 8.5 9.2
Malaysiaa
Primary 4.2 –1.1 0.0 0.1
Secondary 6.9 –1.8 0.2 0.1
Tertiary 0.3 3.3 1.5 1.5
The Philippinesa
Primary 1.2 –3.0 –1.9 –1.9
Secondary 2.9 –6.6 –2.6 –3.6
Tertiary 8.1 5.6 2.3 2.5
Singapore
Primary 18.2 3.2 –4.0 –4.0
Secondary 8.9 –4.2 –5.6 –6.6
Tertiary 1.9 4.5 0.6 1.0
Thailanda
Primary 3.1 0.7 –0.2 –0.1
Secondary –5.3 –8.0 –0.7 –0.8
Tertiary 0.3 8.1 1.3 1.3
Chinaa
Primary 36.6 –6.5 –1.1 –0.2
Secondary 132.0 –16.7 4.5 2.5
Tertiary 245.2 43.7 28.7 32.5
Source: FTAP model projections, partial and general equilibrium closures.
aAggregate capital stock projected to increase in general equilibrium closure.ated income eﬀects (including the net foreign income ﬂows associated with
FDI).
In broad terms, the imposition of factor supply constraints is the single
most important step in taking the partial equilibrium sectoral results to-
ward their general equilibrium values.
Even with factor supply constraints, the results for the tertiary sector in
each region are qualitatively quite close to the partial equilibrium results:
• the services sectors in Japan and the United States are still smaller than
in the absence of services trade liberalization;
• the services sectors in most other high-income economies are also pro-
jected to decline (Korea is the exception); and 
• the services sectors in the ASEAN region and China still gain from ser-
vices trade liberalization.
Now, however, the wage-rental ratios in each economy adjust to ensure
that the induced output changes in other sectors do not lead to a violation
of the overall primary factor supply constraints. Thus, the output of the pri-
mary and secondary sectors in Japan, the United States, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong is now projected to rise to counteract the decline in their services sec-
tors. In the ASEAN region, China, and Korea, output in many of the pri-
mary and secondary sectors is now projected to decline to oﬀset the expan-
sion of their services sectors.
One question is whether the changes in wage-rental ratios in the “ﬁxed
factors” version of the model are consistent with those predicted by the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. That theorem would predict that in the face of
a decline in the relative price of services (induced by services trade liberal-
ization) there would be a decline in the real return to the factor of produc-
tion used relatively intensively in the services sector. In most economies,
that factor is labor (see ﬁgure 1.1). Although the assumption of ﬁxed factor
supplies and perfect factor mobility is consistent with the assumptions of
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, there are many other assumptions in the
“ﬁxed factors” model that do not match the textbook Stolper-Samuelson
assumptions exactly. It is nevertheless useful to see if the “ﬁxed factors”
model retains a Stolper-Samuelson ﬂavor in the context of services trade
liberalization.
Broadly speaking, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem would predict a de-
cline in the wage-rental ratio in most economies; by contrast, the wage-
rental ratio faced by producers in all economies in the “ﬁxed factors” model
is projected to rise. The reason is simple. Services trade liberalization in-
cludes liberalization of FDI in the services sector. The removal of taxes on
service-sector capital leads to a direct and signiﬁcant decline in capital
rentals, relative to wages, because, with ﬁxed capital supplies, the loss of
rents from barriers to capital are borne directly by capital owners.8
34 Philippa Dee, Kevin Hanslow, and Tien Phamduc
8. The implication of this for regional incomes is not yet incorporated.Thus, the nature of barriers to services trade leads to a signiﬁcant depar-
ture from one of the standard textbook trade theorems.9
The results in the third column hint at the complexity of the capital
supply story in the full FTAP model. Even though services trade liberaliza-
tion involves removing taxes on service-sector capital, it is not always the
case that cautious investors would invest more in those service sectors than
they would if they viewed investment in any sector as being equally desir-
able (consistent with perfect sectoral capital mobility). In Japan, the United
States, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, service-sector capital stocks are
larger than in the “ﬁxed factors” case, but in the other economies they are
smaller. This demonstrates how the capital supply behavior in the FTAP
model plays an important role in relocating capital across regions within a
sector, as opposed to the textbook treatment of capital allocation across
sectors within a region.
One question is whether the sectoral output responses associated with a
change in aggregate capital stocks are consistent with those predicted by the
Rybczynski theorem. That theorem states that if product prices are ﬁxed
(say, by “world prices”), an expansion in capital would lead to an expansion
in the output of the product that uses capital relatively intensively and a
contraction of the other product. Leamer and Levinsohn (1994, 7) give an
insightful reinterpretation of the Rybczynski theorem:
What is really at stake here is not the Rybczynski Theorem but rather its
traveling companion, the Factor Price Equalization Theorem. These re-
sults together imply that factor supply changes . . . do not have much
aﬀect [sic] on factor prices because the potential aﬀect [sic] on factor
prices is dissipated by product mix changes in favor of the products that
use the accumulating factor intensively.
Clearly, critical assumptions of the Rybczynski Theorem do not hold in
the FTAP model. Products are imperfect substitutes, so that product prices
are not “given” to any single region. As a result, relative factor prices can
also change to absorb the impact of an increase in capital, so that it does not
have to be absorbed by changes in product composition.
However, one would expect the FTAP model to display the same under-
lying economic forces that lead to the Rybczynski result under its special set
of assumptions. This can be demonstrated in an intermediate simulation in
which aggregate capital in each region moves as it does in general equilib-
rium but is still perfectly mobile between sectors (thus, each region still has
a unique economy-wide wage-rental ratio). In this intermediate simulation,
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9. The particular result depends on the assumption that barriers to trade in services create
rents rather than raising costs. If barriers to services trade raise costs and hence move the pro-
duction possibility frontier toward the origin, then services trade liberalization could raise the
real returns to all factors of production, although the eﬀects on relative factor returns could
still be unclear a priori. Brown, Deardorﬀ, and Stern (2000) also show how real returns to both
factors can be raised by the additional gains from trade arising from increasing returns to
scale, competition, and product variety, even when barriers are treated as tariﬀ equivalents.there is the expected relationship between the direction of movement of the
capital stock and whether the wage-rental ratio is higher or lower than in
the “ﬁxed factors” version of the model. When the capital stock rises, the
wage-rental ratio is higher than in the “ﬁxed factors” case, and when the
capital stock falls, the wage-rental ratio is lower.
The ﬁnal column of table 1.4 incorporates the FTAP model’s income
linkages: real income in each region is no longer constant but reﬂects the in-
duced changes in factor prices and international capital movements. Dee
and Hanslow (2000) demonstrate that such income eﬀects are crucial to the
welfare implications of liberalizing trade in services, as will be seen shortly.
However, table 1.4 shows that these income eﬀects do not have strong addi-
tional eﬀects on the sectoral distribution of gains from services trade liber-
alization.
General equilibrium models are often regarded as “black boxes,” oﬀering
little chance of understanding what is inside. The above analysis suggests
that because the structure of barriers to services trade is complex, the hard-
est part about understanding the eﬀects of multilateral liberalization of ser-
vices trade is understanding what happens in partial equilibrium.
The partial equilibrium results help to demonstrate how liberalization of
services trade can diﬀer from tariﬀ removal. Barriers to services trade aﬀect
domestic new entrants as well as foreign suppliers, and the sector to beneﬁt
most in output terms from liberalization can often be the services sector itself.
The transition from partial to general equilibrium analysis also demon-
strates how some of the standard textbook results fail to hold in the context
of services trade liberalization. In particular, because services trade barri-
ers aﬀect the price of service-sector capital as well as service-sector output,
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem fails to hold: the movement of relative fac-
tor prices is dominated by the removal of the barriers to capital movement.
The Rybczynski theorem also fails to hold in its textbook form, but the
underlying economic forces that lead to its result are still relevant.
1.3.3 General Equilibrium Welfare Eﬀects
The ﬁrst column of table 1.5 summarizes the eﬀects of full liberalization
of services trade on economic well-being in selected model regions (Dee and
Hanslow [2000] present results for all model regions). As in GTAP, the mea-
sure of economic well-being is the equivalent variation—essentially a mea-
sure of the change in real income in each region, where the deﬂator is an in-
dex of the prices of household consumption, government consumption,
and national saving. For FTAP, however, the relevant measure of national
income is net national product—the income accruing to the residents of a
region—rather than net domestic product—the income generated within
the borders of a region. Thus, net domestic product is adjusted for the in-
come earned on outward FDI, net of the income repatriated overseas from
inward FDI, plus the income from net bond holdings.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Three of the selected economies are projected to have incomes lower than
otherwise as a result of full multilateral liberalization of services trade—the
United States, Taiwan, and Singapore. Dee and Hanslow (2000) show that
in each case, the losses from multilateral liberalization of services trade
would be more than oﬀset by income gains accruing from multilateral lib-
eralization of trade in agriculture and manufacturing. Nevertheless, the
source of the income losses from multilateral liberalization of services trade
warrants further investigation, especially for the United States, where the
losses are projected to be signiﬁcant. 
Dee and Hanslow show that for agricultural and manufacturing liberal-
ization, the welfare results are dominated by two things: the contribution of
improvements in allocative eﬃciency, and the contribution of induced
changes in the terms of trade. The model’s regions are projected to experi-
ence positive income gains, or in a few cases small losses, as a result of these
eﬀects.
For services liberalization, changes in FDI patterns contribute several
additional eﬀects. First, FDI can lead to an expansion or contraction in the
capital stock located within a region, leading to a positive or negative con-
tribution to income generated within a region from this change in national
endowments. Second, it can lead to changes in net FDI and net lending po-
sitions, with consequent changes in net foreign income ﬂows accruing to
residents. Third, it can induce changes in the returns earned on those net
foreign asset holdings. An important example here is changes in the rents
earned on FDI.
The second column of table 1.5 shows the contribution to real income
from changes in real capital endowments. Generally, if capital endowments
are higher than otherwise, real GDP will be higher than otherwise, and vice
versa.10A major reason that Singapore is projected to lose slightly from ser-
vices trade liberalization is that its capital stock is projected to be lower than
otherwise.
However, a lower capital stock located domestically need not always lead
to lower incomes for domestic residents. Earnings from higher outward
FDI and higher lending abroad could oﬀset it. The third column of table 1.5
shows the contribution to residents’ real income from changes in real FDI
stocks. The fourth column shows the contribution from changes in real
bond holdings. Both also help to indicate the way in which changes in cap-
ital endowments are ﬁnanced.
For example, Japan’s capital stock is lower than otherwise, but it has a big
increase in outward FDI. In fact, it also borrows (a negative change in bond
holding) in order to ﬁnance its outward FDI. By contrast, China’s increase
in capital endowments comes partly from a large increase in inward FDI
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10. For a few regions, real GDP can be higher than otherwise, even if endowments are lower
than otherwise, because the endowments are used more eﬃciently.and partly from additional foreign borrowing. Thus, the large projected in-
crease in China’s service-sector output and exports, noted above, comes as
much from an expansion in foreign-owned service ﬁrms located in China as
it does from an expansion in Chinese-owned service ﬁrms. The United
States is projected to have a smaller capital endowment than otherwise, but
this is oﬀset to some extent by an increase in outward FDI and increased
lending to other regions.
For a few regions, real incomes are aﬀected not so much by changes in net
asset positions, but by changes in returns on those assets. Although the de-
tails are not shown in table 1.5, Taiwan is projected to lose slightly from ser-
vices trade liberalization, primarily because in the FTAP database it is a net
creditor economy and is adversely aﬀected by a small induced fall in real in-
terest rates.11
A further source of change in asset returns is the change in rents gener-
ated by barriers to services trade. The last column of table 1.5 shows the in-
come contribution to recipient countries of changes in the rents accruing to
FDI, as barriers to services trade are eliminated. What is striking is the loss
of rents to the main providers of outward FDI—Japan, Hong Kong, and
the United States. In fact, the loss of rents to U.S. incumbent multination-
als is more than suﬃcient to explain its overall projected income loss from
multilateral liberalization of services trade. Note, however, that this result
is sensitive to the assumption that all barriers to services trade are rent-
creating rather than cost-raising.12
Generally, although induced changes in capital stocks—both those lo-
cated domestically and those owned abroad—do not appear to play a ma-
jor role in explaining the eﬀects of multilateral services trade liberalization
on sectoral output, they play a major role in explaining the eﬀects on real
regional incomes. Barriers to services trade aﬀect capital movements as well
as the output of services ﬁrms, so services trade liberalization can have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the regional location and ownership of capital. The
ﬂow-on eﬀects to regional incomes demonstrate another way in which lib-
eralization of services trade can diﬀer from tariﬀ removal.
1.4 Agenda for Further Research
Much of the research agenda for further development of the FTAP
model has been outlined already. It involves continuing to obtain estimates
of the price impacts of barriers to services trade along the lines outlined in
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11. Interest rates fall primarily because of an assumption that government saving rates are
held constant. Growing revenues and saving levels, therefore, allow some government debt re-
tirement.
12. Brown, Deardorﬀ, and Stern (2000) show that if barriers are cost-escalating, then wel-
fare eﬀects are dominated by the movement of real physical capital. However, they have a more
simple treatment of proﬁt repatriation and debt service payments than here.Findlay and Warren (2000), both for additional sectors and for additional
modes of service delivery within a sector. The methodologies should in the
process reveal whether the barriers are rent-creating or cost-raising. Such
methods could also be used to estimate the price impact of barriers to FDI
in agriculture and manufacturing. More sectoral detail needs to be incor-
porated into FTAP, to model the barriers to each service separately. More
research is required to obtain more realistic output estimates and cost and
sales structures for FDI ﬁrms and, if possible, a realistic initial allocation of
rents. Additionally, the welfare measure in FTAP needs to be amended to
take account of the costs of risk taking, given risk aversion.
In addition, some of the simplifying assumptions made during the origi-
nal development of FTAP could now be relaxed, and the sensitivity of the
results to these assumptions tested. One such assumption was the unifor-
mity of behavioral parameters across sectors and regions. Although this re-
ﬂected a deliberate research strategy, its importance could be tested using
systematic sensitivity analysis (Arndt and Pearson 1996). The importance
of data issues (e.g., the initial distribution of rents) and theoretical issues
(e.g., investor behavior) could also be explored.
However, there is also scope for much more work using simple analytical
models of services trade that better incorporate the features of services and
the nature of the barriers to their trade. Insights of the sort available in
Markusen, Rutherford, and Hunter (1995), for example, provide invaluable
guidance to those attempting to build better empirical models of FDI and
services trade.
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Comment Fukunari Kimura
The research group of the Productivity Commission of Australia has con-
ducted a series of great eﬀort in quantifying the economic eﬀects of liberal-
izing trade in services and has contributed to constructive discussion in a
number of international academic and semi-academic forums. Admittedly,
it is not at all easy to measure the magnitude of barriers to services trade as
well as formulating a reasonable policy simulation model with rigorous the-
oretical framework. Nevertheless, it is crucially important to quantify pos-
sible eﬀects of trade liberalization in order for policy makers to carry on a
constructive discussion resisting various politico-economic pressures. The
current paper presents a step forward in taking care of some of the features
unique to trade in services vis-à-vis trade in goods.
Modes of Services Transactions
One of the novel features of this paper is the introduction of explicit treat-
ment for modes of services transactions. The General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) of the Marrakesh Agreement deﬁnes four modes of ser-
vices transactions: cross-border, consumption abroad, commercial presence,
and natural persons. The past literature has tried to construct simulation
models with a structure analogous to that for merchandise trade, but those
models could only deal with the ﬁrst mode, cross-border. The other three
modes of services transactions require more sophisticated formulations in
terms of factor movements across the national border, the place where fac-
tor services are inputted, and the nature of corresponding trade barriers.
Measuring the Cost of Barriers to Trade in Services 43
Fukunari Kimura is professor of economics at Keio University.The paper particularly puts emphasis on the most important mode of ser-
vices transactions, that is, commercial presence. Service provision in this
mode is initiated from the establishment of a local aﬃliate or a local branch
through international capital movement (typically foreign direct invest-
ment [FDI]), and then services are produced in combination with local re-
sources such as labor. The model traces the service supply structure by
introducing international capital movement. Furthermore, the model
distinguishes two types of barriers to services trade: barriers to establishing
commercial presence and barriers to ongoing operation. These two roughly
correspond to the concept of market access and national treatment in the
table of concession of GATS. The former is modeled as taxes on the move-
ment of capital, and the latter is formalized as taxes on the output of the
service-providing ﬁrms.
Of course, the statistical measurement of such barriers, as well as the
quantiﬁcation of international capital movement, is not at all easy, and thus
simulation results must be regarded as provisionary. However, the pioneer-
ing treatment of mode-3 service transactions will surely become a starting
point to formalize services trade in future research.
Handling Capital
The authors call their model FTAP as a special version of GTAP with
FDI. Foreign direct investment is diﬀerent from simple international capi-
tal movements such as portfolio investment in an important way: it is ac-
companied by the movements of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets such as technology and
managerial know-how. Particularly in less developed economies, aﬃliates
of foreign ﬁrms behave quite diﬀerently from local indigenous ﬁrms in
terms of technology, managerial know-how, the pattern of purchases and
sales, and the degree of exposure to foreign markets. Therefore, to seriously
model FDI, we prefer to distinguish capital by the owner’s nationality in ad-
dition to the location where capital services are used.1
Such expansion of dimension in policy simulation models raises a num-
ber of issues to be solved. One issue is the availability of statistical data. The
pioneering work by Petri (1997) as well as that of Dee, Hanslow, and Pham-
duc basically relies on FDI ﬂow data in estimating the magnitude of activi-
ties of aﬃliates of multinational enterprises (MNEs). However, we have a
number of problems in this approach to data construction. First of all, we
are not sure whether FDI data properly include reinvestment from retained
earnings by aﬃliates abroad. The treatment of joint ventures is another
problem. Moreover, the available ﬁgures are for investment ﬂows, and thus
we need uneasy transformation from ﬂow to stock. After all, we have only
capital stock estimates, which may not be a good proxy for the magnitude
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1. See Baldwin and Kimura (1998) on the more detailed discussion on ownership, control,
and location when considering FDI.of activities of aﬃliates. We actually have some fragmental but direct infor-
mation on activities of aﬃliates of MNEs. The Department of Commerce
of the U.S. Government and the Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry (renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry in January
2001) of the Japanese Government, for example, compile ample activity
data on U.S. and Japanese aﬃliates abroad. Some hosting countries such as
Singapore and Malaysia include ﬁrm-nationality information in manufac-
turing censuses. Such information must be utilized to improve the quality of
activity data in future research.
Another fundamental issue is the conceptual framework with which to
introduce ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets in theoretically consistent models.2 This pa-
per makes an important contribution to the literature on this matter. In the
model, investors ﬁrst divide their wealth between “bonds” and “real physi-
cal capital,” and then the former go to foreign portfolio investment with
perfect arbitrage while the latter proceed to domestic physical investment
and FDI with imperfect substitution. This treatment allows the introduc-
tion of ﬁrm-nationality-speciﬁc physical capital.
The paper includes an interesting discussion on the nesting structure of
commodity demand. Petri (1997) sets the ownership of producers as a
higher nest and then goes down to the location of producers as a lower-rank
nest. In contrast, the present paper works with the opposite order. The for-
mer formulation is attractive if we think much of the existence of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc assets. For instance, VCRs produced in a Sony plant located in
Malaysia are closer substitutes for Japanese-made VCRs in Japan than they
are for VCRs produced in a local indigenous plant located in Malaysia.
Dee, Hanslow, and Phamduc, however, claim that services must meet local
tastes and requirements and thus the location of production should come
earlier than the nationality of producers. We obviously need more discus-
sion on how to formulate the nationality of ﬁrms and the location of pro-
duction.
Welfare Eﬀects
The paper displays the simulation results of removing barriers to trade in
services in a step-by-step, intuitive manner by starting from partial equilib-
rium eﬀects and then explaining general equilibrium eﬀects. The partial
equilibrium results in which factor prices as well as domestic factor supplies
are ﬁxed look reasonable; with the removal of barriers to trade in services,
countries originally with high barriers will gain the most, and those with
low barriers will get hurt. Then factor prices are endogenously adjusted,
and international capital movements are allowed in the general equilib-
rium, where the welfare gains are spread out to most of the countries.
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2. Kimura and Tsutsumi (1998) list a number of conceptual issues to introduce ﬁrm-
nationality-speciﬁc capital in computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.Some uneasy results, particularly the negative welfare eﬀects on the U.S.
economy in the general equilibrium setting, should not be worried about
too much. Rather, we must realize that the setting for FDI is crucially im-
portant in estimating the liberalization eﬀects. If, for example, the U.S. ser-
vice providers are more competitive than Japanese ones, the pattern of FDI
may drastically change, resulting in diﬀerent welfare impacts across coun-
tries. Firm-speciﬁc or ﬁrm-nationality-speciﬁc assets can also be a source
of market power, which the symmetric constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) nesting of product diﬀerentiation may not properly capture. Again,
the key issue is how to formulate MNEs in simulation models.
Concluding Remarks
In summary, this paper makes a big step forward toward quantifying the
cost of barriers to trade in services, which is crucially important in setting
up a constructive policy discussion. The simulation results, however, have
not reached the level of attracting very serious consideration from the
nonacademic circle. A major task will be determining how to formulate
MNEs in theoretically rigorous models. Although the paper makes a sig-
niﬁcant contribution to this subject, we have a number of things to settle in
the future from both theoretical and empirical points of view. Another im-
portant task for us is to make primary statistical data collection of good
quality. As for the FDI-related data, the best way to capture the activities of
aﬃliates of MNEs is to collect information in the framework of host coun-
tries’ establishment or ﬁrm censuses. Physical activities are, after all, much
easier to capture than ﬂows of ﬁnancial transactions. As for service trans-
actions, the balance-of-payments statistics cover only a small portion of
trade in services. We must develop a statistical framework to capture vari-
ous aspects of services trade covering four modes and possibly service con-
tents in merchandise trade.
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